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Abstract
Open economy extensions of otherwise typical DGE models have met with some diﬃculties. It is hard
for example to replicate the correlation between output and the trade balance, as well as the variance of the
latter variable. The correlation between the trade balance and the terms of trade is also problematic. Capital
adjustment costs have been suggested to resolve some of these problems. In this paper, we propose a dynamic
general equilibrium model which incorporates asymmetry in information and agency costs as an alternative.
The model considers the possibility, associated with Irving Fisher’s (1933) “debt-deﬂation” story of the great
depression, that entrepreneurs may be limited in their investment activities by their amount of net worth.
This limitation implies that the level of internal ﬁnancing available for projects will inﬂuence aggregate
economic activity. The main conclusion is that the proposed model is able to replicate the Canadian stylized
facts fairly well. Moreover, compared to a typical DGE model, its predictions regarding the autocorrelation
functions of output growth and investment are closer to those observed in the data.I Introduction
Financial variables, such as entrepreneurs’ net worth, play no important role in standard Dynamic
General Equilibrium (DGE) models because investment can be ﬁnanced indiﬀerently through the
use of internal funds or external borrowing. In this idealized framework, the Modigliani-Miller
theorem prevails and the balance between internal and external funding is irrelevant for investment.
This is because they entail the same cost. Hence, business cycle dynamics are unaﬀected by
“ﬁnancial” variables. Calibrated versions of standard DGE models have been fairly successful
in replicating ﬁrst and second moments of important economic time series, but have met some
diﬃculties in generating realistic autocorrelation functions for variables such as output growth and
investment.
In contrast, Bernanke and Gertler (1989) proposes a model where entrepreneurs have an in-
formational advantage over lenders. Only the former group can costlessly observe the output of
their projects. The implied agency costs, imposed on the newly created capital, increase with
the amount of external ﬁnancing required. In this framework, a negative shock to entrepreneurs’
net worth leads to lower investment, creating a link between real and ﬁnancial variables. This is
very much in the spirit of Fisher’s (1933) debt-deﬂation story of the great depression.1 Moreover,
following a positive aggregate productivity shock, the model predicts a hump-shaped behavior for
investment and output which is consistent with the empirical ﬁndings in Cogley and Nason (1995)
regarding the autocorrelation functions of these variables.
Fuerst (1995) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997)2 have introduced in a DGE environment the
type of informational asymmetry and agency costs present in Bernanke and Gertler (1989).3 Their
1Bernanke (1983) and Mishkin (1978) also linked the severity of the great depression to ﬁnancial variables such
as low entrepreneurs’ net worth.
2CF hereafter.
3For a complete review of models related to the economics of information, see Stiglitz (2000).
1objective was to provide a quantitative measure of the importance of this type of ﬁnancial constraint
on business cycle dynamics. The simulation exercises performed in CF are based on a closed
economy model calibrated on United States data. The authors are able to reproduce the hump-
shaped behavior of output, hours of work and investment following a temporary but persistent
productivity shock. This is signiﬁcant since standard DGE models are unable to reproduce hump-
shaped dynamics. These promising results invite further investigation of the role played by agency
costs in the propagation of economy wide shocks.
In this paper, we build a dynamic general equilibrium model which incorporates asymmetry in
information and agency costs similar to those proposed in Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Greenwald
and Stiglitz (1993) and CF.4 We extend their analysis by considering a small open economy model
in order to allow for the presence of exogenous terms of trade shocks in addition to the usual
productivity shocks. Open economy extensions of otherwise typical DGE models have met with
some diﬃculties. It is hard for example to replicate the correlation between output and the trade
balance, as well as the variance of the latter variable. The correlation between the trade balance
and the terms of trade is also problematic. Mendoza (1991) suggests capital adjustment costs
to resolve some of these problems. When calibrated to a small open economy, namely Canada,
the proposed model makes realistic predictions with respect to output, investment and the trade
balance. In this paper, we consider agency costs as an alternative to capital adjustment costs. A
detailed comparison of all predicted moments with the data is performed. Moreover, we consider
the issue of the hump-shaped behavior of output, labor hours and investment, not addressed in
Mendoza (1991).
Our main conclusions can be summarized in the following way. First, the proposed model is
4There are other ways of introducing credit rationing. Recently, Wasmer and Weil (2000) considers a model where
credit market imperfections are introduced in a symmetrical way to labor market frictions by using search and a
matching function between lenders and entrepreneurs similar to the one aﬀecting employers and workers. Aiyagari
and Williamson (1999) also analyzes credit rationing in a random matching model.
2able to replicate the Canadian stylized facts fairly well. The predicted correlation between the trade
balance and the terms of trade is positive and close to one half as in the data. The model also
replicates very closely the high variance of the trade balance. It is unable however to reproduce
the small negative correlation between the trade balance and GDP observed in Canadian data.
The model predicts a small positive correlation. Second, terms of trade shocks are the main source
of disturbances inﬂuencing the dynamics of the model via, among other things, its inﬂuence on
net worth. In particular we observe that approximately 80% of the ﬂuctuations in output can
be accounted by this variable. Third, compared to a standard DGE model, the predictions of the
proposed model regarding the autocorrelation functions of output growth and investment are closer
to those observed in the data.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II presents an overview of the complete model.
In section III, the structure of the contract between lenders and entrepreneurs is discussed. The
problems facing consumers, entrepreneurs and ﬁrms are also presented and resolved. The proposed
model is then calibrated to Canadian data in Section IV. Results from simulation exercises are
reported and discussed in Section V. Finally, conclusions are drawn in the last section.
II The Environment
We consider a small open economy composed of three types of agents, consumers/lenders, ﬁrms
and entrepreneurs. The consumers/lenders maximize lifetime utility. Over their lifetime, con-
sumers accumulate/decumulate wealth in the form of domestic capital goods and international
lending/borrowing. They earn income by supplying labor and by renting capital to domestic ﬁrms.
They also invest in a domestic mutual fund that ﬁnances the economy’s entrepreneurs. The nature
and role of this mutual fund are explained in greater detail below. Firms maximize proﬁts and
produce tradable and nontradable goods with a constant return to scale technology subjected to
3exogenous technology shocks. The third type of agent, labeled entrepreneurs, operates the tech-
nology required to produce the economy’s capital stock. More speciﬁcally, it is assumed that new
capital goods cannot be imported from abroad and must be produced locally using a simple linear
technology which combines domestic and imported goods as inputs.
Entrepreneurs use their net worth and borrow from domestic ﬁnancial intermediaries to ﬁnance
their purchase of domestic and imported inputs. No direct external borrowing is allowed.5 To
keep the model manageable, it is assumed that entrepreneurs ﬁnancial transactions are carried
out through a capital mutual fund and are limited to within period transactions. The sequence
of events during a typical period is as follows. At the beginning of the period, the technology
shock and terms of trade are observed by everyone. Firms hire labor and rent capital inputs from
consumers and entrepreneurs to produce domestic consumption goods. Consumers decide on their
consumption level, labor eﬀort, capital accumulation, international lending/borrowing and on the
loan made to entrepreneurs through the mutual fund. Entrepreneurs use all their net worth and
the resources borrowed from the mutual fund to buy the combination of perishable domestic and
imported goods required to produce the domestic capital good. Parameter values are selected to
make net worth small enough to ensure borrowing.
A distinctive feature of the model is that entrepreneurs are the only ones to costlessly ob-
serve their output which is subject to a random outcome. Others cannot privately observe an
entrepreneur’s output without incurring an auditing cost. After observing his project outcome,
an entrepreneur decides whether to repay the mutual fund or to default on his loan.6 In case of
default, the ﬁnancial intermediary audits the loan and recovers the project outcome less monitoring
5This feature of the model can be motivated by the assumption that monitoring costs for foreign mutual funds are
too high. In general equilibrium, new capital can however be ﬁnanced abroad, indirectly, through consumers/lenders
borrowing in the world capital market and lending to the local mutual fund.
6There is a moral hazard problem since in the absence of monitoring the entrepreneur would have an incentive to
report low outcomes.
4costs.7 All of these events occur within the period and the mutual fund has no meaningful role to
play between periods.
Interactions with the rest of the world are the following. To produce new capital goods, en-
trepreneurs must import foreign goods. The economy is small in the sense that the relative price
of foreign goods – the terms of trade – is exogenous. To pay for imports, the tradable good pro-
duced locally can be exported. Preferences are such that the consumer/lender consumes both local
goods (tradable and non tradable) and the imported goods, while the entrepreneur specializes in
consumption of the imported good. Moreover, individual consumers can borrow from (or lend to)
the rest of the world at the world market interest rate. The capital mutual fund has no direct
link with the outside world. It can best be seen as a local cooperative that facilitates ﬁnancial
transactions between the residents of the small economy. No outside borrowing or lending is made
by this institution.
III Interactions between Firms, Entrepreneurs and Lenders
In this section, agents optimization problems are discussed in greater details. The ﬁnancial contract
between the mutual fund and the entrepreneurs are also presented. The economy is inhabited by
inﬁnitely lived agents. In order to preclude entrepreneurs from ever accumulating enough net
worth to render borrowing unnecessary, it is assumed that they discount the future more heavily
than consumers. Entrepreneurs’ subjective discount factor will be modeled as a positive fraction
° of lenders’ subjective discount factor ¯.8 Let us now turn to the complete description of the
optimization problems beginning with the ﬁrm’s problem.
7By assumption, random monitoring is ruled out. As demonstrated in Gale and Hellwig (1985) and Williamson
(1987), a debt contract with default in some states of the world is the optimal contract between the two parties in
this type of setup.
8CF made a similar hypothesis.
5III.1 The Firms
We assume that ﬁrms produce both types of goods and allocate factors of production between
sectors so as to maximize net receipts, Πt, expressed in terms of the domestically produced tradable
good (the num´ eraire):
Πt = F(#K
t ¢ Kt;#L
t ¢ Lt;At) + pnt ¢ G((1 ¡ #K
t ) ¢ Kt;(1 ¡ #L
t ) ¢ Lt;At) ¡ rtKt ¡ wtLt, (1)
where, pnt, rt and wt are respectively the price of nontradable goods, the rental rate of capital and
the wage rate, all measured in terms of the num´ eraire. F(¢) and G(¢) are the production functions
for tradable and nontradable goods respectively, Kt and Lt measure capital and labor inputs, while
#K
t and #L
t give the shares of inputs used in the tradable sector. Finally, At is a vector of the
other factors aﬀecting production in both sectors. The production functions are Cobb-Douglas and









where, ' and À represent the shares of capital in the tradable and nontradable sectors respectively.
Under the assumption that ﬁrms behave competitively in goods and factors markets, optimal
choices of Lt, Kt, #L
t and #K
t must satisfy the following necessary conditions.9
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9Where we postulate that ﬁrms are always at an interior solution.
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Equations (4) and (5) are the familiar static conditions for factor demands that equates the
value of marginal products to factor prices in each period. The following two equations state that
the optimal allocation of labor and capital between sectors must equalize the marginal products of
each factor.
III.2 The Entrepreneurs
This section presents the entrepreneur’s decision problem in greater details. We proceed in two
steps. First, Section III.2(i) develops the intra-period loan contract between a typical entrepreneur
and the ﬁnancial intermediary, taking the perspective of an entrepreneur having nt units of net
worth. Then, Section III.2(ii) looks at the question of the optimal accumulation of net worth over
time.
III.2(i) The Contract
This section adapts CF’s contractual arrangement between entrepreneurs and the mutual fund to
the case where the production of new capital goods partly uses imported goods. As will be seen
below, this modiﬁcation introduces the terms of trade as an additional variable inﬂuencing the
model’s investment supply function. This creates a new channel, working through the supply side
of the model, by which terms of trade shocks can induce economic ﬂuctuations. The main features
of the contractual arrangement are as follows. It is assumed that entrepreneurs produce the new
capital goods with a simple linear technology that uses a composite good, it, made of domestic
(id
t) and imported (i
f
t ) goods, as input. More speciﬁcally, the composite good it is a Leontief
function, min[·d ¢ id
t;·f ¢ i
f
t ], of id
t and i
f
t , where ·d and ·f are the parameters determining the
optimal mix id and if in the composite investment good. it units of the composite good invested
7by the entrepreneur produces !t¢it units of new domestic capital, where !t is a random component
aﬀecting this production.
The assumption that the composite investment good is a Leontief function of domestic and for-
eign goods is made to preserve the linearity required for consistent aggregation among entrepreneurs.
Linearity of new capital formation is preserved with this assumption because costs minimization
will induce all entrepreneurs, regardless of net worth, to use domestic and foreign inputs in the




t. Uncertainty in the capital production technology exists at the
entrepreneur level but not the aggregate level; !t is i.i.d. across entrepreneurs and time. It cannot
take a negative value and has a mean of one. The distribution and density functions of !t will
be denoted Φ(!t) and Á(!t) respectively. For the calibration exercise performed in Section IV,
! will be assumed to obey a lognormal distribution. By assumption, the realized value of !t is
private information to the entrepreneur. Others can privately observe the project outcome at a
cost equal to the destruction of º ¢it units of the capital good. Parameters are set to insure that an
entrepreneur’s net worth, nt, measured in units of the num´ eraire, always falls short of the project’s
cost, (1 + ·d
·f ¢ pt) ¢ id
t, where pt is the terms of trade.10 As a result, the typical entrepreneur will
be looking to ﬁnance part of his project externally. There exists a domestic ﬁnancial interme-
diary that specializes in making risky loans to entrepreneurs. An entrepreneur who borrows an
amount equal to (1 + ·d
·f ¢ pt) ¢ id
t ¡ nt of the num´ eraire agrees to repay the ﬁnancial intermediary
(1+ rk
t ) ¢[(1+ ·d
·f ¢pt) ¢id
t ¡ nt] units of new capital at the end of the period, where rk
t is the loan’s
interest rate. Loans are risky because entrepreneurs default when project outcomes !t¢·d¢id do not
cover loan repayments (1+rk
t )¢[(1+ ·d
·f ¢pt)¢id
t ¡nt].11 Default induces the ﬁnancial intermediary
10By convention, the terms of trade, pt, is the number of units of domestically produced tradable goods (the
num´ eraire) required to purchase one unit of foreign good. As a result, it costs i
d
t + pt ¢ i
f
t units of the num´ eraire to
invest it units of the composite good in the linear technology. Given the cost minimizing mix of domestic and foreign
goods, project costs can alternatively be expressed as (1 +
·d
·f ¢ pt) ¢ i
d
t.
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8to audit the projects and to recoup the project outcomes !t ¢ ·d ¢ id
t less the audit costs º ¢ ·d ¢ id
t.
One can deﬁne a critical value for !t below which an entrepreneur will default.
¯ !t = (1 + rk
t ) ¢ [(1 +
·d
·f ¢ pt) ¢ id





Deﬁne f(¯ !t) and g(¯ !t) as the expected income shares accruing to entrepreneurs and lenders.
Then, expected income of entrepreneurs and lenders can be deﬁned as:12
qt ¢ ·d ¢ id
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(10)
Where qt is the market price of new capital goods. Observe that expected income shares do not
sum to unity because of expected monitoring costs Φ(¯ !t) ¢ º.
Under the additional assumptions that all the economic rent goes to entrepreneurs and that
entrepreneurs expected income from carrying out their project is at least as high as their invested
net worth, the optimal contract implies maximization of the entrepreneurs’ capital income subject
to the condition that lenders’ income be no less than what they would get by simply retaining the
funds. The optimal contract therefore involves the following two conditions:
qt ¢ ·d ¢
½














·f ¢ pt ¡ qt ¢ ·d ¢ g(¯ !t)
)
nt (12)
12Additional details concerning the f(¯ !t) and g(¯ !t) functions can be found in CF.
9Together, conditions (11) and (12) imply that investment supply is an increasing function of
the price of capital, qt, of net worth, nt, and a decreasing function of the terms of trade, pt.13 CF
had already highlighted the relationship between qt, nt and it. Our analysis reveals that the terms
of trade, pt, is an additional variable that impinges on investment supply in an open economy
context. As a result, there will be an additional channel, going through the supply side of the
model, by which terms of trade shocks will induce economic ﬂuctuations in our framework. The
relationship between investment and net worth is where the Modigliani-Miller theorem breaks down
in this framework. In general equilibrium, the price of capital and entrepreneurs’ net worth are
two endogenous variables and the rest of the model will seek to determine how they are aﬀected by
exogenous factors such as terms of trade and technology shocks.
III.2(ii) Entrepreneurs’ Capital Accumulation Decisions
Entrepreneurs are assumed to be risk neutral and to maximize expected discounted lifetime con-
sumption. For simplicity, it is assumed that they consume imported goods (ef) only.14 The
objective at the end of time t of a typical entrepreneur owning ke
t units of capital is
V (ke







pt ¢ eft = re
t ¢ nt ¡ qt ¢ ke
t+1 (14)








·d ¢ f(¯ !t) ¢ qt
1 + ·d
·f ¢ pt ¡ ·d ¢ g(¯ !t) ¢ qt
(16)
13Recall that pt is deﬁned as the price of imports divided by the price of exports, and that investment goods are
imported.
14Alternatively, it could be assumed that entrepreneurs’ preferences are of the Leontief type.
10Recall that the entrepreneur’s subjective discount factor is a fraction ° of the consumer’s discount
factor. This assumption is made to ensure that entrepreneurs never accumulate enough net worth
to dispense from external investment ﬁnance altogether. Equation (14) is the entrepreneur’s budget
constraint. It says that a successful entrepreneur (i.e. non bankrupted) having invested nt units of
net worth in his capital producing technology receives re
t ¢ nt as investment income at the end of
the period, where re
t is the rate of return of internal fund. This income is then used to purchase eft
units of foreign consumption goods and ke
t+1 units of capital bought at prices pt and qt respectively.
Equation (15) states that the entrepreneur’s net worth comes from two sources: the rental in-
come, rt¢ke
t, earned from renting ke
t units of capital to ﬁrms producing goods, and the undepreciated
value of his beginning of period capital stock (1 ¡ ±) ¢ qt ¢ ke
t.15 Equation (16) deﬁnes the expected
return on internal funds. Intuitively, an entrepreneur investing nt units of net worth, in a project
expected to yield qt ¢ f(¯ !t) ¢ ·d ¢ id
t, earns a return of
qt¢f(¯ !t)¢·d¢id
t
nt on his investment.
The optimal choice of ke
t+1 gives rise to the following Euler condition:
° ¢ ¯ ¢ Etf[(rt+1 + (1 ¡ ±) ¢ qt+1) ¢ re
t+1]=pt+1g ¡ (qt=pt) = 0 (17)
which represents the usual tradeoﬀ between current and future expected marginal utility of con-
sumption, expressed here directly in units of good since the entrepreneur is risk neutral. We now
turn to the choices made by the other group of agents.
III.3 The Consumers/Lenders
The consumers/lenders maximize expected discounted lifetime utility. Instantaneous utility is as-
sumed to depend on consumption of domestic and imported goods as well as on leisure time. Agents
15In practice, entrepreneurs should also accumulate net worth through labor income to ensure positive net worth
in all states of the world. Here, we follow Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998) and we abstract from entrepreneur’s labor
supply in order to simplify the presentation.
11earn income from their work eﬀort, from renting their capital goods to ﬁrms and from their in-
vestment in the world bond market. At each period, they can accumulate (liquidate) assets by
acquiring (selling) domestic capital or by investing (borrowing) in foreign bonds. Consequently,
the representative consumer/lender faces the following problem at time t:
V (bt;kt) = maxu(cdt;cft;cnt;1 ¡ lt) + ¯Et[V (bt+1;kt+1)] (18)
subject to
rt ¢ kt + wt ¢ lt + qt ¢ (1 ¡ ±) ¢ kt + bt+1 ¢ Rt+1 ¡ bt ¡ cdt ¡ pnt ¢ cnt ¡ pt ¢ cft ¡ qt ¢ kt+1 = 0 (19)
where u(¢) is the instantaneous utility function, cdt is consumption of the domestically produced
tradable good, cft is consumption of the foreign good, cnt is consumption of the domestic nontrad-
able good and lt is work eﬀort. Time is normalized to one, so leisure is (1¡lt). Note that kt+1 and
bt+1 refer to capital and bond holding decisions made in period t for period t+1. Moreover, note
the convention that a positive value for bt represents an external debt (expressed in terms of the
num´ eraire). Capital goods are bought at the market price qt and international borrowing is made
at the discount rate Rt+1.16
Optimal choices of cdt, cft, cnt, lt, bt+1 and kt+1 give rise to the following ﬁrst-order conditions:
ucd (¢t) ¡ ¸t = 0 (20)
ucf (¢t) ¡ pt ¢ ¸t = 0 (21)
ucn (¢t) ¡ pnt ¢ ¸t = 0 (22)
uh (¢t) + wt ¢ ¸t = 0 (23)
16In other words, the real rate of interest on international loans made between periods t and t+1 equals
1
Rt+1 ¡ 1.
12Rt+1 ¢ ¸t ¡ ¯ ¢ Et[¸t+1] = 0 (24)
¯Et[((1 ¡ ±) ¢ qt+1 + rt+1) ¢ ¸t+1] ¡ qt ¢ ¸t = 0 (25)
The ﬁrst four static conditions state the rate at which the consumer is willing to substitute within
period the consumption of domestic tradable and nontradable goods, the foreign good and leisure.
The next two conditions pertain to the optimal intertemporal allocation of international bond and
domestic capital. Finally, for strictly positive values of the Lagrange multiplier, ¸t > 0, the budget
constraint (19) is also binding. In the calibration exercise performed below the following functional
form for the instantaneous utility function is used:









+ Ã ¢ log(1 ¡ lt) (26)
where µ reﬂects the share of domestic goods in consumption of tradables, ¹ determines the con-
sumer’s willingness to substitute tradables and non tradables in consumption, while (1=") is the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption. Finally, Ã determines the share of leisure
in the global basket of consumption. For simplicity, leisure and goods consumption are assumed
separable in utility. We now turn to the task of closing the model.
III.4 The General Equilibrium
The general equilibrium involves the simultaneous resolution of equations (4)-(7) of the ﬁrm’s
problem, equations (11) and (12) of the optimal debt contract problem, equations (15), (16) and
(17) of the entrepreneur’s problem, and equations (19) to (25) of the consumer/lender’s problem,
together with the goods and factors market clearing conditions.
Aggregate population is normalized to unity, with a continuum of agents divided between ´
entrepreneurs and (1¡´) consumers. Therefore, the market clearing conditions of the labor market
13is:
Lt = (1 ¡ ´) ¢ lt (27)
Clearing the rental market of capital requires that the demand for capital services be equal to
the supply, namely:
Kt = (1 ¡ ´) ¢ kt + ´ ¢ ke
t (28)
In a small open economy, clearing the goods market requires two conditions. First, domestic
demand and supply of nontradable must always be equalized. Second, the economy’s trade balance,
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Finally, one must also take into account the law of motion of the aggregate capital stock:
Kt+1 = (1 ¡ ±) ¢ Kt + ´ ¢ [1 ¡ Φ(¯ !t) ¢ º] ¢ it (31)
This equation reﬂects the fact that a fraction of new capital production, given by Φ(¯ !t) ¢ º ¢ i, is
lost in monitoring costs.17
To close the model, one must specify the stochastic processes governing the terms of trade, pt,
and the productivity shock, At. For simplicity, we make the usual assumption that the logarithm
of both shocks follow stationary independent AR(1) processes.
lnpt = ½p ¢ lnpt¡1 + ²t (32)
17Recall that the production of new capital contributing to capital accumulation is limited to the sum of f(¯ !t)¢º ¢i
and g(¯ !t) ¢ º ¢ i.
14and,
lnAt = ½A ¢ lnAt¡1 + ³t (33)
Where innovations, ²t and ³t, are independent, centered on zero and have constant variances.
Implicit in (32) and (33) is the assumption that steady state values of At and pt are normalized to
unity.
It is well known that external debt is indeterminate in small open economy versions of the repre-
sentative agent model when ¯ and the world interest rate are exogenous. In a deterministic setting,
agents would borrow or lend indeﬁnitely depending on whether ¯ < R or ¯ > R, with resulting
inﬁnite debt accumulation or decumulation. While, the small country international indebtedness
would stay constant at its exogenously given initial value if ¯ = R. To side-step this feature of
the model and obtain a determinate level for the country’s external debt, we make the ad hoc but
reasonable assumption that the implicit interest rate at which domestic consumers can borrow from
the rest of the world depends on the country’s aggregate external debt (B) in the following way.18
Rt+1 = R? ¢ e¡»¢Bt¡Â¢[Bt+1¡Bt] (34)
This equation states that the interest rate at which individual consumers can borrow interna-
tionally depends negatively on the world benchmark discount factor R? and positively on the level
and the change in the country’s aggregate outstanding debt B.19. With this assumption, the world
benchmark factor is only available to consumers in countries with no outstanding debt (Bt = 0)
and zero current aggregate borrowing (Bt+1 ¡ Bt = 0).20
18There exists in the literature two alternative solutions to make external debt determinate. Firstly, one can
follow Obstfeld (1981) and make ¯ respond to agent’s wealth in a way that precludes inﬁnite debt accumulation or
decumulation. Secondly, one can adopt Blanchard (1985) perpetual youth model. As in our setup, both alternatives
are not without problems. Obstfeld’s solution, although intuitive, leaves open the question of the exact functional
form to use. On the other hand, aggregation issues limit severely the form of utility in Blanchard’s model.
19Recall that Rt+1 is one divided by one plus the real rate of interest.
20Senhadji (1997) makes a fairly similar assumption in his study of the sources of debt accumulation in small open
economies.
15IV Calibration
IV.1 Business Cycles Facts in a Small Open Economy
The model is calibrated to reproduce the stylized facts from a typical small open economy, Canada.
All of the relevant data has been obtained from the CANSIM database provided by Statistics
Canada, except for the entrepreneur internal rate of return which comes from the Canadian Fi-
nancial Markets Research Centre database. Seasonnally adjusted quarterly data is used and the
sample period is 1961:1-2001:4, making 164 observations.
Table 1 reports various statistics of interest pertaining to the canadian economy. All variables
are evaluated at domestic prices and have been subjected to the following transformations. They
are expressed in logarithm, with the exception of the trade balance, and the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter
was applied to remove the trend.21 To facilitate comparisons with the existing literature, we use
two alternative deﬁnitions for the trade balance. The ﬁrst measure(tb1), due to Stockman and
Tesar (1995), is the diﬀerence between hpﬁltered exports and imports. Alternatively, Mendoza
(1991) reports statistics related to the ratio of the trade balance to GDP. We also present statistics
calculated with this second deﬁnition that we refer to as tb2.
The ﬁrst column of Table 1 reports the standard deviation of real GDP, private consumption,
investment, exports, imports, the trade balance and hours of work. The next column presents the
standard deviation in proportion to the standard deviation of GDP. Column three summarizes the
correlation between each variable and output. In the fourth column, correlations with the terms
of trade are presented. Lastly, the ﬁfth column shows the ﬁrst autocorrelation coeﬃcient for the
same series.
Columns one and two of Table 1 reveal that private consumption is nearly as variable as pro-
21The smoothing parameter was chosen to be 1600.
16duction in Canada when a broad measure of consumption which includes the purchase of durable
goods is used.22 This high variability of consumption should test severely intertemporal models
based on the principle of consumption smoothing. It can next be observed that the standard de-
viation of investment is higher by a factor of 4.5 compared to real GDP, which is fairly standard.
The next four lines of the table pertain to the external sector and they highlight some interesting
additional features of the data. In particular, both imports and exports are more variable than
output with imports having the highest variance, again a prediction that would normally not result
from a typical model with consumption smoothing. Lastly, the variance of the trade balance is
either higher or roughly equal to the variability of output depending on the deﬁnition used. It is
higher for Stockman and Tesar’s deﬁnition, and the same for Mendoza’s ratio.
One often ﬁnds that the trade balance is counter-cyclical in industrialized country. See for
instance Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992). As shown in the third column of Table 1, this
feature is also present in Canadian data since our two measures agree on the counter-cyclical
behaviour of the Canadian trade balance. It should be noted that, for the same consumption
smoothing reason, standard DGE models have met great diﬃculties replicating a counter-cyclical
trade balance. Finally, the last line of Table 1 indicates that the measured correlation between the
cyclical components of hours and production is at 0.62. This correlation is a bit lower that the
value of 0.69 found by Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1995) for Canada, but their sample period
was ten years shorter than ours.
Also of interest in an open economy context, is the instantaneous correlation between the terms
of trade and the trade balance. For the period considered, it is positive for both deﬁnitions of
the trade balance. Finally, the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation coeﬃcients have mean values ranging
between 0.50 and 0.92, which is similar to frequently reported values. The other statistics generally
22Removing durables from our deﬁnition of consumption reduces the variability of consumption somewhat.
17conform to what is known about other countries’ business cycles.
Table 1: Canadian Business Cycle Statistics
¾i ¾i=¾y ½i;y ½i;p ½i
GDP 0.015 1.00 1.00 -0.147 0.838
Consumption 0.012 0.835 0.819 -0.233 0.764
Investment 0.066 4.51 0.791 -0.351 0.717
Exports 0.038 2.60 0.614 0.152 0.718
Imports 0.048 3.27 0.725 -0.339 0.805
Trade balance (tb1) 0.041 2.83 -0.273 0.531 0.753
Trade balance (tb2) 0.016 1.08 -0.161 0.329 0.919
Hours of work 0.008 0.467 0.618 0.023 0.494
Note. ¾i = standard deviation of variable i, ½i;y = correlation of i with GDP, ½i;p
= correlation of i with the terms of trade deﬁned as the price of imports divided
by the price of exports, and ½i = coeﬃcient of autocorrelation at lag one. tb1 is the
diﬀerence between hpﬁltered exports and imports, and tb2 is the ratio of the trade
balance to GDP. Seasonnally adjusted quarterly data is used and the sample period
is 1961:1-2001:4 (except for hours of work with sample 1976:1-2001:4). The ratios
in column 2 may diﬀer from those obtained by dividing the standard deviations in
column 1 due to rounding.
IV.2 Setting Parameter Values
The parameter settings have been based, as much as possible, on the existing literature. In the
case where this was impossible, they have been estimated from the data, or calibrated to replicate
speciﬁc sample moments.
The ﬁrst group of parameters to be discussed are those drawn from the existing literature. The
world benchmark discount factor R? has been ﬁxed to 0.99 which implies a world annual real interest
rate of 4%. This corresponds to the value generally used in the DGE literature. The depreciation
rate of capital, ±, has been set at 2.6% per quarter. Once again this is a value close to what is
generally found in the literature for this parameter. The income share of capital in the tradable
(') and nontradable (À) sectors have been set respectively to 0.43 and 0.28 which are the values
estimated by Macklem (1993) on Canadian data. The elasticity of intertemporal substitution in
18consumption " is set to 1.0, a value also used in CF. Following Stockman and Tesar (1995), µ and
¹ which determine the share of domestic goods in the basket of tradable goods and the willingness
to substitute tradable and nontradable goods in consumption are ﬁxed at 0.5 and 1.273.23 There
is no real consensus on the cost of bankruptcy in the literature. We follow CF and set º at 0.25, a
value that is roughly in the middle of the range of existing estimates.
The second group of parameters has been selected to make the model’s steady-state equilibrium
compatible with observed stylized facts. One generally ﬁnds that households allocate 33% of time
endowment to work eﬀort. This requires that Ã be set to 1.717 in the artiﬁcial economy. The
value of ¯ and » were selected to reproduce two stylized facts about the Canadian economy. First,
Macklem (1993) reports that Canada’s net foreign indebtedness is around 35% of GDP. Second,
over the sample period, the Canadian annual real rate of interest has been, on average, 111 basis
points higher than the US real rate. Setting ¯ at 0.987 and » at 0.004 makes the model replicate
exactly these moments.24
We set ° and ¾ to match the quarterly default rate and the return on internal funds. However,
no direct measure of the default rate exists for the Canadian economy and we have used CF’s
estimate of 0.974%. Given the similarities of the Canadian and US economies, this value should be
close to the true Canadian default rate. Our target for the steady-state return on internal funds
is 5.3%, a value based on the Canadian equity premium estimated with data from the Canadian
Financial Markets Research Centre database. Matching these two moments requires ° and ¾ to be
set respectively at 0.949 and 0.229.25
As mentioned previously, the exogenous state variables are assumed to follow independent AR(1)
processes. The parameters of the stochastic process governing the terms of trade was estimated
23The implied elasticity of substitution between tradable and nontradable goods,
1
1+¹, is therefore 0.44.
24Conditional on the values of the other parameters.
25These match closely CF’s values for these parameters.
19by ordinary least square. The Canadian terms of trade was measured as the ratio of import to
export price deﬂators. The estimated persistence parameter (½p) is 0.87 with an associated standard
deviation of 0.013 for the terms of trade innovation.26 The productivity shock is calibrated so as to
replicate the variance and persistence of GDP, given the parameters of the model and the process
governing pt. Consequently, the persistence parameter ½A is set at 0.25 and the standard deviation
of the innovation at 0.005.27
We are left with ·d, ·f, Â and ´ as the last parameters to ﬁx. The latter, ´, is simply a
normalization parameter and was set at 0.5. We set ·d and ·f at 2.0.28 This implies that 38 percent
of imports goes for capital formation in steady state equilibrium.29 Finally, Â, determines the
sensitivity of the individual international borrowing rate to current aggregate borrowing (Bt+1¡Bt).
Given the absence of strong empirical evidence on this coeﬃcient, a value was picked arbitrarily.
Our benchmark simulations are base on a value of 0.10 for Â. This value implies that if the
country wanted to borrow internationally an additional amount (from steady state) equal to 10%
of its steady state debt level, its borrowing rate would increase by sixty basis points. We perform
a sensitivity analysis to assess the robustness of our results to diﬀerent values for Â. Table 2
summarizes the parameter settings used in the simulations reported below.
26Backus et al. (1995) reports similar estimates for a smaller sample period.
27With a highly persistent and large terms of trade shock, the productivity shock required to reproduce the output
serial correlation and variance is relatively small and has a low persistence parameter. Mendoza (1991) reports a
value of 0.36 for ½
A.
28The values of ·
d and ·
f was constrained by numerical issues. In particular, we were not successful in ﬁnding the
steady-state equilibrium when ·
d or ·
f was set below 2.0
29This is somewhat lower than the number reported in the World Development Report (1994). For instance,
Table 14 of that report revealed that in 1992, ﬁfty percent of Canadian merchandise imports were made of machinery
and equipment. The World Bank statistic refers to the share in merchandise imports however. On can presume that
the statistic would have been lower had all types of imports been considered.
20Table 2: Parameter Values
± = 0:026 µ = 0:5 ´ = 0:5 R? = 0:99
' = 0:43 ¹ = 1:273 º = 0:25 Â = 0:10
À = 0:28 " = 1:0 ¾ = 0:229 ·f = 2:0
½p = 0:87 Ã = 1:717 ° = 0:949 ·d = 2:0
½A = 0:25 ¯ = 0:987 » = 0:004
These parameter values are those used in the benchmark model from which the
simulation results presented in the paper are obtained.
V The Model’s Predictions
V.1 Replicating the Stylized Facts
As a ﬁrst task, it is important to verify whether the artiﬁcial economy replicates well the business
cycles facts exposed above. Table 3 reports the business cycle statistics derived from the artiﬁcial
economy with agency costs. The model’s numerical solution is obtained with the King, Plosser
and Rebelo (1987) algorithm. All statistics refer to population moments derived from the model’s
numerical solution.30 Columns one to ﬁve of this table report the standard deviation, the standard
deviation in proportion to GDP, the correlation coeﬃcients with GDP and the terms of trade, and
the ﬁrst autocorrelation coeﬃcient of the variables pertaining to the artiﬁcial economy. The model
has predictions about more variables than those observed in the data, some of these additional
statistics are also presented in this table.
Closed economy models generally predict that the variance of consumption is smaller than
the variance of GDP. Here, the access to international markets implies that consumers/lenders
have an even greater opportunity to smooth out consumption than in a closed economy setting.
However, in the presence of asymmetric information and agency costs, entrepreneurs behave very
diﬀerently. For example, a negative terms of trade shock (a fall in the price of imports) induces
30Additional details on the method used to compute population moments can be found on pages 41 and 42 of King
et al. (1987).
21them to produce more capital goods. Since their production activity is limited by their level of
net worth, they temporarily consume less in order to carry out their investment plans, and then
consume more again. This makes their consumption level very volatile as shown in the bottom
part of Table 3. But since their consumption level is very small, it contributes only marginally to
the variance of aggregate consumption. The model predicts a ratio ¾c=¾y of roughly seventy-ﬁve
percent for aggregate consumption. This number is only a bit smaller than what is observed in the
data.
Another moment that is reasonably well matched by the data is the variance of investment.
This is an interesting feature of the model since this is the mechanism through which agency costs
operate. The data suggests a ratio ¾I=¾y of 4.5, while the agency cost model predicts 5.2. This
number is still too high, but that aspect of the model does a lot better than a simple DGE model
would. For example, Mendoza (1991) reports a predicted ratio of 7.5. As suggested by the latter,
introducing capital adjustment costs can also bring this statistic in line with the data.
Table 3: Business Cycle Statistics in an Artiﬁcial Economy with Agency Costs
¾i ¾i=¾y ½i;y ½i;p ½i
GDP 0.015 1.00 1.00 -0.568 0.838
Consumption 0.011 0.748 0.616 0.140 0.785
Investment 0.078 5.18 0.408 -0.880 0.927
Exports 0.029 1.95 0.680 0.143 0.704
Imports 0.029 1.92 0.491 -0.631 0.728
Trade balance (tb1) 0.045 2.98 0.139 0.496 0.750
Trade balance (tb2) 0.015 0.968 0.130 0.502 0.751
Hours of work 0.008 0.501 0.773 -0.811 0.773
Entrepreneurs Consumption 0.494 33.0 0.260 0.032 0.258
Lenders Consumption 0.010 0.638 0.603 0.151 0.959
Entrepreneurs Net Worth 0.070 4.66 0.334 -0.764 0.872
Bankruptcy Probability 0.140 9.36 0.435 -0.776 0.418
Note. ¾i = standard deviation of variable i, ½i;y = correlation of i with GDP, ½i;p
= correlation of i with the terms of trade and ½i = coeﬃcient of autocorrelation
at lag one. The ratios in column 2 may diﬀer from those obtained by dividing the
standard deviations in column 1 due to rounding.
22The model underestimates the standard deviations of exports and imports taken separately,
but is very good at replicating the variability of the trade balance. Canadian data suggest that
imports are slightly more volatile than exports, a feature that the model is not able to reproduce.
Consumption smoothing is operative in this setup leading to a more severely underestimated vari-
ance of imports and a predicted slightly pro-cyclical behavior of the trade balance that is not found
in the data.31 It can be observed however that the correlation between the trade balance and
the terms of trade is predicted to be positive at roughly one half, as is the case for the Canadian
economy. Overall it can be said that with respect to replicating the moments presented in Table 1,
the agency cost model performs fairly well.
Two other interesting predictions of the agency cost model are presented in Table 3. First,
entrepreneurs’ net worth is predicted to be nearly ﬁve times more volatile than output. Following
a serially correlated negative terms of trade shock for example, entrepreneurs will reduce current
consumption in order to increase their net worth and produce more capital goods. This behavior
makes net worth and entrepreneurs’ consumption very volatile. Second, the predicted probability
of bankruptcy, Φ(¯ !t), has a high variance and is pro-cyclical. This result is inherent to the contract
speciﬁed. One should note that this prediction does not arise from the open economy extension
performed in this analysis, since it would be present in a closed economy context as well.
In order to evaluate the impact of changing some of the parameters for which no direct evidence
was available, the results from a sensitivity analysis are reported. The main statistics for these
alternative speciﬁcations are reported in Table 4. The ﬁrst line shows what happens when the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution, (1="), is halved. The next two lines vary the parameter
aﬀecting the interest rate when the amount borrowed internationally changes. The parameter Â is
31Mendoza (1991) indicates that small adjustment costs can lead to a predicted negative correlation between the
trade balance and output. Adding liquidity constraints on the consumers side as in Carmichael, K´ eita and Samson
(1999) also seems to produce more realistic variances and correlations.
23Table 4: Sensitivity Analysis
¾c=¾y ¾I=¾y ¾x=¾y ¾im=¾y ¾h=¾y ½tb1;y ½tb1;p
" = 2:0 0.691 5.7 2.24 2.06 0.473 0.179 0.489
Â = 0:25 0.842 4.19 1.44 1.34 0.576 0.154 0.477
Â = 0:05 0.737 6.55 2.59 2.71 0.507 0.139 0.453
Where, c = consumption, I = investment, x = exports, im = imports, h = hours of work, and tb
= trade balance. Using tb
2 instead of tb
1 does not change the results signiﬁcantly.
ﬁrst increased to 0.25 and then decreased to 0.05. No signiﬁcant changes are apparent from the
benchmark case discussed previously with the possible exception that reducing Â makes imports
slightly more variable than exports as observed in the data.
V.2 Simulations
This section presents the results from two simulation exercises. We consider the impact of temporary
but persistent disturbances that move the economy away from the steady state for a certain period of
time. We focus on the eﬀects of productivity and terms of trade disturbances. The autocorrelation
coeﬃcient being positive in both cases, we consider below the impact of shocks that disappear only
gradually, but more so in the case of the external shock. The impact of this terms of trade shock
is ﬁrst considered. Recall that since the economy is small, it takes the behavior of this variable as
given.
V.2(i) Terms of Trade Shock
The ﬁrst experiment considers the impact of a positive 1 % terms of trade shock, which represents
a rise in the relative price of imports. This shock persists for some time due to the associated
positive autocorrelation coeﬃcient, 0:87, in the pt equation. The impulse response of the economy
is depicted in the various panels of Figure 1. The lines drawn in each panel reproduce the immediate
24percentage changes in the variables from the initial steady state and the paths describing the return
of each variable to this steady state. The shock occurs in period four.
The increase in the terms of trade makes the composite investment good more expensive. This
reduces entrepreneurs’ capacity to produce new capital, at all levels of net worth, and it generates
a shift to the left of in the investment supply function. As a result, the price of new capital is
pushed up at the period of the shock. This causes a decline in investment demand and results
in a smaller amount of capital good being produced. The fall in investment is accompanied, in
general equilibrium, by an increase in consumers/lenders consumption, even though the foreign
component of consumption is negatively aﬀected by the shock, thanks to the higher relative price
of imports. Higher consumption induces households to reduce labor supply, which in turn makes
aggregate output fall. In order to achieve their planned consumption in the face of a lower income,
households borrow temporarily from the rest of the world.
Entrepreneurs see their consumption of the foreign good increase in the ﬁrst period. There
are two forces behind this phenomenon. First, the foreign good being more expensive they would
normally like to consume less of it, however, since they cannot substitute for the domestic good or
leisure this impact is not signiﬁcant. Second, since the price of new capital is higher, they prefer
to accumulate less capital for the future and to consume more in the present. The combined rises
in households and entrepreneurs consumption is responsible for the period four movement of the
trade balance towards a deﬁcit.
Entrepreneurs’ net worth is aﬀected positively at impact because of the higher price of capi-
tal. The fall in investment leads however to a smaller capital stock in period ﬁve. As a result,
entrepreneurs’ net worth start declining the period following the shock, which leads to still lower
future investment supply and higher future price of new capital. Rising capital price stimulates
consumption spending, particularly households’, and discourages capital accumulation. The lower
25Figure 1: Terms of trade shock
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26capital stock held by entrepreneurs will imply another fall in their level of net worth the following
period and another fall in investment. Given the temporary nature of the shock, these variables
eventually start returning to their steady state.
Figure 1 highlights some interesting features of this open economy model with agency costs.
Firstly, a terms of trade shock leads to hump shape responses for investment and GDP. The dynamic
response of GDP can easily be traced to the paths of the capital stock and of hours of work.
Secondly, a depreciation of the terms of trade produces a J-curve type responses for the trade
balance that is somewhat similar to those observed in the data. Here, the initial deﬁcit of the
trade balance comes from the consumption burst caused by the high price of capital. Thirdly, the
impulse responses depicted in Figure 1 reveal that agency costs aﬀect the dynamics of the model,
particularly during the early periods following the shock. Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) and (1998)
studied extensively the impulse responses of a closed economy following a persistent productivity
shock. Many of the distinctive features highlighted by these authors are preserved in an open
economy setting with a terms of trade shock accounting for most of the ﬂuctuations.
V.2(ii) Productivity Shock
The second experiment considers the impact of a positive 1 % productivity shock. This shock
persists only for a short time due to the associated small autocorrelation coeﬃcient, 0:25, in the
At equation. The impulse response of the economy is depicted in the various panels of Figure 2.
As previously, the lines drawn in each panel reproduce the immediate percentage changes in the
variables from the initial steady state and the paths describing the return of each variable to this
steady state. Once again, the shock occurs in period four.
The eﬀect of a positive productivity shock in a DGE model are well known to depend on
two opposing forces. On one hand, higher productivity raises the level of output and induces a
27pro-saving eﬀect as households attempt to smooth out the extra consumption over many future
periods. However, the assumed persistence of the shock generates, on the other hand, an opposing
pro-borrowing eﬀect because households simultaneously want to install new capital to capture
the beneﬁt of higher productivity, as soon as possible. Obstfeld (1986) and Finn (1990) show
that the strength of the pro-borrowing eﬀect increases with the degree of persistence of the shock
because the expected marginal product of capital is higher over a longer horizon, making capital
accumulation more attractive. In a closed economy setup, these opposing eﬀects are brought in line
by the movement of the real interest rate. As a result, saving and investment are essentially the
same decision in closed economy model, investment being simply the share of output that is left
unconsumed. In a small open economy model, the real interest rate is exogenous and the relative
strength of these opposing eﬀects determine instead the cyclical nature of the trade balance. The
pro-saving eﬀect makes the trade balance pro-cyclical while the pro-borrowing eﬀect induces a
counter-cyclical movement. Here, the calibrated productivity shock is not persistent enough to
make the second eﬀect dominant and the trade balance is, accordingly, predicted to be pro-cyclical.
A positive productivity shock raises the marginal product of labor and makes leisure more costly.
Consumers/lenders respond by increasing their work eﬀort. They also increase their demand for all
types of goods. These consumers also want to save part of their increased income in order to smooth
out consumption. They have two means of saving, capital good accumulation (investment), and
international lending (or reduction in external debt). For the benchmark scenario, the immediate
eﬀects go in the direction of more investment demand and less borrowing. At the period of the
shock, investment demand increases more than investment supply because entrepreneurs ability to
produce new capital is limited by their net worth. Therefore, the price of capital must rise to bring
demand in line with the limited supply.
Given the low persistence of the shock, the higher marginal product of capital does not last
28Figure 2: Productivity shock
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29long enough to induce entrepreneurs to accumulate capital. Contrary to consumers/lenders, en-
trepreneurs ﬁnd optimal to reduce their end-of-period capital stock and to increase their consump-
tion by more than 5% at impact. CF ﬁnd instead that entrepreneurs’ consumption falls at impact.
This diﬀerence results from the divergence in the assumed persistence of productivity shocks. The
longer the productivity shock lasts, the longer is the horizon over which the demand for new capital
is aﬀected positively. With investment depending on agency costs, entrepreneurs’ ability to produce
the required capital is severely limited by their net worth. As a result, entrepreneurs have a strong
incentive to build net worth at a faster pace to rip the reward brought by the improved productivity
of capital. At impact, this can be done by reducing their consumption. Here, productivity shocks
do not last long enough to induce this behavior.
The interesting aspects related to the serial correlation of important variables noted in the case
of the terms of trade shock - and in CF for a productivity shock - are not present here because of
the very small persistence of the disturbance. The variables adjust at impact and then the return
to the steady state starts the following period. No hump-shaped behavior is observed in this case.
It should be recalled however that most of the ﬂuctuations in output are accounted for by terms of
trade movements when the model is calibrated to Canadian data.
VI Conclusion
This paper has put the emphasis on informational considerations. We have built a dynamic general
equilibrium model which incorporates asymmetry in information and agency costs. We extend the
analysis in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) by considering a small open economy model in order to
allow for the presence of exogenous terms of trade shocks in addition to the usual productivity
shocks. Open economy extensions of otherwise typical DGE models have met with some diﬃculties
when trying to replicate moments related to the trade balance in particular. Capital adjustment
30costs have been introduced in the literature to solve this problem. In this paper, we have considered
agency costs as an alternative to capital adjustment costs.
Our main conclusions can be summarized in the following way. First, the proposed model is
able to replicate the stylized facts of the economy considered, Canada, quite well. The predicted
correlation between the trade balance and the terms of trade is positive and close to one half as in
the data. The model also replicates very closely the high variance of the trade balance. It is unable
however to reproduce the small negative correlation between the trade balance and GDP observed
in the Canadian data. Second, terms of trade shocks are the main source of disturbances inﬂuencing
the dynamics of the model via, among other things, its inﬂuence on net worth. Third, compared
to a standard DGE model, the predictions of the proposed model regarding the autocorrelation
functions of output growth and investment are closer to those observed in the data.
In summary, capital adjustment costs are better at replicating the counter-cyclical behavior of
the trade balance, but they do not produce the hump-shaped behavior of output and investment
agency costs generate following a terms of trade shock. Combining these two predictions must still
be done and is an avenue for future research.
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